The lessons of Varsovian's reconnaissance by Bents, D. J.
NASA Technical Memorandum 103207
The Lessons
of Varsovian's
Reconnaissance
D.J. Bents
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio
i.r_._ _!,!A T j" A!!t.r
dncl ,,s
r, =_/ ':7"; 02"/5 I.Q ':)
Prepared for the
Case for Mars IV
cosponsored by the American Astronautical Society, Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
Los Alamos Laboratory, Ames Research Center, Lyndon B. Johnson Space
Center, George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, and the Planetary Society
Boulder, Colorado, June 4-8, 1990
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19900017473 2020-03-19T21:18:14+00:00Z

The Lessons of Varsovian's Reconnaissance
D.J. Bents t
"The path made by a Leader is tread on sand;
his track is seen for others to foGow
ordy as one footstep foGows another.
For if he stands st/G, the tra/_/s erased;
its footprints washed away by the changing tide. "
--- Domitius Lucullan, 195 AD
I want to tell you a story about advanced missions, planning for advanced
missions, and the technology that enables advanced missions. I want to
illustrate what is required of a technology for it to be truly enabling. We
pride ourselves on our technical capabilities; we have detailed knowledge
of the devices and systems we could build for those missions; how they
work, how soon we might be able to develop them, the degree of technical
risk involved. We know better than most people how mission requirements
influence the development of new technologies. Sometimes, however, we
fail to appreciate the economic requirements that enable the mission in
the first place.
We believe that today we have the enabling technology which could bring
about a new age of exploration and discovery. For the first time in human
history we possess the physical means of leaving our own world and
traveling to new worlds. New worlds out there waiting to be explored,
waiting for the crunch of human footsteps, waiting to give us new
discoveries and surprises.
We believe we have the technology -- today, right now -- to begin this new
age of exploration, but since the costs are so great, and we are not able to
prove beforehand the extent of the benefits that might accrue to pursuing
these adventures, we cannot justify the risk and expense. Therefore, we
falter at the challenge.
tNational Aeronautics and Space Administration, Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio 44135.
At this point we should remember that there was a previous age of
discovery and exploration when men left their known world behind and
discovered a new one. This did not happen as soon as it could have. It took
place well after the Renaissance began, a thousand years after the fall of
Rome.
Curiously enough, the ancients had available to them the science and
technology that would have enabled that age of discovery. Beginning with
the Greeks the dark curtain of superstition was already parting, giving way
to scientific understanding based on observation and measurement. By the
time of the Roman Empire, everyone knew the world was round -- and by
the end of the second century AD they could locate the parts of the world
they knew with maps of surprising geometric fidelity, by means of
astronomical observations.
In fact, the scientific knowledge, and the accompanying technology and
organizational skills that the Romans mastered allowed them to gain
military and political dominance of western civilization for hundreds of
years. Their resulting economic strength sustained regular contact and
trade with the rest of the known world including the eastern civilizations
in India and China. Their knowledge about the world was not entirely
accurate, but it was sufficient for them to know, for example, that the
Orient could be found by going west. Their technology, even though limited
compared to that of 15th century Europe, was capable of taken them there.
Of all ancient peoples the Romans had developed the discipline and
organization necessary to carry out missions of exploration. More than any
other society before them they had mastered the art of complex
organization -- they had learned to bureaucratize; that is, to split up a
large effort into smaller more easily manageable tasks and recombine the
results into a unified cohesive whole.
If the Romans were capable of preceding Columbus, why didn't they? Let
us imagine for a moment that we could go back in time and stand there, on
the waterfront at Ostia, that ancient port city on the mouth of the river
Tiber, gateway to Imperial Rome ....
The crumbling stone pier juts out into the harbor towards the breakwall.
On late summer afternoons like this one the breeze blows onshore, carrying
with it the pungent aromas of the Mediterranean, the shriek of gulls that
wheel and dip in wide circles over the harbor. The harbor is crowded with
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vessels of every kind; from huge war galleys with multiple banks of oars
that stroke the water in confident, well-coordinated, wingbeat-like
sweeps, to lighters and tenders scurrying among the larger ships like
beetles. And sailing vessels too: mostly merchantmen who are tied up at
the docks or riding at anchor near the harbor mouth, waiting for evening,
when the wind will shift direction from onshore to an offshore breeze and
carry them out to sea.
A few paces away from us staring out to sea is a very distinguished
looking figure ( fig. 1 ), his arms folded behind him at parade rest.
His cape is scarlet, trimmed with ermine. He wears the silver
breastplate of a Proconsul. His retinue is huddled some distance behind
him; muttering to themselves, casting worried glances over in his
direction. Their master is not in a good mood. He is scowling; his jaw is
set with hard lines around his mouth. Lucius Marcellus Varsovian is not a
happy man. He has driven his chariot hard all the back from the capitol
after being handed one of the few defeats in his career. To compound his
frustration, insult has been added to injury -- the westbound courier
already cleared the harbor earlier during the day, so he is unable to obtain
passage home on a military galley. The first leg of the long voyage to
Spain will have to be on a merchant vessel, a sailing ship. He is not
accustomed to having to wait for the wind to change and he is furious.
The senate refused to back him again. Too bad -- his proposal was bold and
imaginative. It could have resulted in a fresh infusion of new riches to the
Empire. Possibly, it could have restored the Empire's declining fortunes,
bringing a new sense of purpose and ending the petty squabbling and
infighting that was now going on. He had proposed an expedition; a sea
voyage from Spain westward across the Great Western Ocean, to find a
more direct way to China than the long overland route traveled by the
caravans. A direct sea route could put all the wealth of China within reach
of Rome. With a sea route this wealth could flow, not by a trickle on the
backs of a few pack animals, but by the shipload. But they refused him
again. How could they be so short-sighted as to reject such a modest
proposal, and one which had such a potentially great payoff? All he had
asked for was some men and a few ships .....
At this point you might be tempted to characterize Lucius Marcellus
Varsovian as a visionary, a man ahead of his time. That would be a
mistake. The ancients ( Table I ) have known the world was round ever
since Aristotle's time; from the calculations of the astronomers
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Eratosthanes and Hipparchus they have a pretty good idea of its size. By
the second century AD, they had even learned how to make maps that were
geometrically accurate, using astronomical observations to locate
position.
And Lucius Marcellus Varsovian is not a dreamer. He is not interested in
exploration or discovery, or opening a sea route for commerce. He wants
to take his armies to China and plunder their cities!
The riches of the Orient have tantalized him for a long time. His
knowledge of China is more tangible than just fables because there is
regular contact and trade in the third century. In earlier times the
emporer Marcus Aurelius had sent emissaries to the Han court in Peking;
their reports told of large cities linked by a network of good roads,
heavily populated but not heavily fortified. The richest ones were furthest
east, located on a wide coastal plain that ended with an ocean. The reports
also indicated that the Chinese empire was more a loose confederation of
fiefdoms than an empire; although every warlord had his own army, there
was no national army nor the political cohesiveness to sustain one -- it
had never been necessary because they were so well isolated.
Distance and geography have kept the two empires apart. The caravan
route to China is a tortuous overland journey which permits a limited
exchange of communication, trade goods and culture but so far has
prevented the more direct form of cultural intercourse that Lucius
Marcellus Varsovian is contemplating. From Asia Minor it winds through
the foothills east of Persia and through the mountain passes of
Afghanistan; over narrow trails where men and animals must travel single
file, easy prey for an ambush. Once over the mountains, the route traces
its way across the mongolian steppe; an easier march here, but by then the
presence of a large army would be known, and the Chinese emporer would
have plenty of time to rally his warlords and prepare defenses. The last
thing Lucius Marcellus wants is to fight an extended battle halfway across
the plains of Mongolia; by the time he reached his targets the troops would
be worn out.
A long overland march simply will not work. Varsovian knows this all too
well-- as a young centurion in Atticus' disasterous Afghan campaign,
he was one of the few who had made it back across the Khyber Pass alive.
But a sea route would change everything. Like his contemporaries Lucius
Marcellus is mainly a land soldier, but he is not entirely unappreciative of
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sea power. He understands the surprise value of an amphibious assault,
having used this tactic successfully to crush the Berber rebellion in
Mauretania. Ferrying his troops along the coast just out of sight of land
until nightfall, then turning towards the beach, he came ashore at dawn and
drove swiftly inland before they could rally their tribes, cutting off their
main encampment and capturing their chief; who was subsequently drawn
and quartered.
As a result of wounds received in this campaign, he was sent to Alexandria
to recuperate, where he spent a rather quiet period in his career
reaquainting himself with the classical education of his youth. He had
been a frequent visitor to the Great Library, and saw there a map of the
world ( fig. 2 ) published by the astronomer Claudius Ptolomy, the first
conical projection based on astronomical observations and the most
accurate map of its time. On this map, the eastern part of China and the
west coast of Spain were opposite -- opposite sides of the world.
Intrigued, he had studied the "syntaxis" which explained how the map had
been made; how astronomy could tell you the size of the world and where
you were located on it. The map showed that the eastern part of China,
where the richest cities were, appeared furthest away from the west
coast of Spain ( where he had been born ) but if that map were wrapped
around a globe according to the method explained in the book ( fig. 3 ), the
east coast of China and the west coast of Spain would actually have to be
facing each other, separated only by an undetermined stretch of ocean. This
distance, according to his calculations and depending on the accuracy of
the astronomical measurements, would be somewhere between 1500 and
2000 leagues. He couldn't fully understand all of the explanations
which led to this result, but they made sense to him and, unlike the
scholars who discussed it at length, he was quick to grasp its military
significance. If that stretch of ocean could be crossed, the richest part of
China might be directly accessible to his armies.
Could this ocean be crossed? 1500 to 2000 leagues of open ocean was a
formidable distance. But not an insurmountable distance. Roughly equal
the Empire's dimensions from western Spain to eastern Persia, it was less
than the sea distance navigated routinely by galleys from Britain to Asia
Minor. What if he could muster his legions at the port of Gades on the west
coast of Spain, load his troops and their catapults into ships and head
directly west? In summertime the sea would be calm. For navigation they
could follow the setting sun, or use lodestone. An accurate landfall
wouldn't be needed -- it would be hard to miss the Chinese coast.
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Compared to the perils of an overland march, a sea voyage would be short
and uneventful. After a few weeks cooped up in their ships, his troops
would be restive and spoiling for a fight, eager to attack. And a seaborne
invasion would not be expected. From an eastern beachhead an invasion
force of only a few thousand troops could easily sweep across the wide
coastal plain unopposed; the cities would be easy prey for his seasoned
legions and their siege engines. Even if the Chinese emperor were able to
rally his minions and prepare a counterattack, that would take time. Time
to allow him an orderly retreat back to his ships, laden with the spoils of
war.
He could return to Rome in triumph. Perhaps become the next emperor.
Lucius Marcellus had a rough understanding of the relationships between
economic growth and military strength. By the third century Rome had
conquered, absorbed and digested all of the western world; there were no
new civilizations nearby left to conquer. The empire was in decline -- his
legions were not engaged in conquest any more, bringing home plunder.
Instead they were relegated to maintaining order on the frontier,
collecting taxes and putting down rebellions. There was no real challenge.
On the other hand, the distant Orient and its fabled cities would provide a
worthy target for his legions. Why waste well-disciplined troops on the
frontier skirmishing with barbarians when their skills are so much more
profitably used against civilised people? Why burn down a few rude huts
in some squalid village, when to the east there are magnificent cities
waiting to be sacked? And what satisfaction is there ravishing unwashed
savages dressed in animal skins with stringy yellow hair and long
fingernails when, to the east, there are palaces to be looted -- filled with
voluptuous princesses, succulent concubines draped in silk and jewels,
their bodies bathed in perfumes and spices...
But -- before his armies could embark; before the ships could clear the
harbor, he would have to have some more information. How far to the
China coast? Where were the best places for landing? Where could an
invasion force land unopposed, or better yet, undetected? The
calculations indicated that his target should lie 1500 to 2000 leagues
west of Spain, but this was only an estimate. An invasion would be
reasonable if the distance were better known, but he couldn't commit
hundreds of ships and thousands of men to a one-way voyage into the
sunset without some assurance that the Great Western Sea was navigable,
and the China coast on the other side. The first mission of the campaign
would therefore have to be a voyage of exploration, not conquest. Or, in the
mind of Lucius Marcellus Varsovian -- a reconnaissance.
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That was the mission: to cross the Great Western Ocean and reconnoiter
the China coastline preparatory to mounting an invasion. The audacity of
this mission, and the ingenious way he used the limited technology of his
time to ensure that it could succeed, demonstrates the extent to which the
art of mission planning was raised by his genius. It serves as an example
to mission planners everywhere who must base their plans for the future
upon the technological capabilities of the present.
What kind of ship could cross that distance? A sailing vessel would seem
the logical choice. By Varsovian's time they were routinely sailed beyond
the Mediterranean up and down the west coasts of Europe and Africa. The
sturdy little merchantmen ( fig. 4 ) which carried Rome's trade to the four
corners of the empire were seaworthy and reasonably fast in a favorable
wind: broad, beamy, bluff-bowed, the Roman trademark was a single large
square sail, loose-footed and placed well forward for stability downwind
in rough seas. Their shallow draft enabled them to be sailed to shore;
most were small and light enough that they could be dragged right up onto
the beach. Their Greek and Phonecian design heritage reflected conditions
on the Mediterranean; generally pleasant but often unpredictable weather
with sudden storms. Hugging the coastline and making forward progress as
long as the wind was behind them, they could steer for shore whenever the
wind turned against them or a storm threatened, and wait there until
better conditions prevailed.
However, that strategy, so effective along the well-settled Mediterranean,
would not work out in the open ocean. And the qualities which made their
ships so suited for sailing under these conditions made them unable to hold
a course more than a few points off the wind. They would not work for
this expedition. If the wind were to blow steadily eastward, they would
never get there. If it blew steadily west they wouldn't make it back.
A more reliable form of propulsion would have to be used. Oars, with the
built-in reliability of hundreds of rowers straining their backs in unison,
would be the propulsion system of choice. Being a military man Varsovian
was well acquainted with them -- from the common galley to the
Emporer's festival barge, all of Rome's official business moved to the
beat of oars. And there was no better type of oared vessel for crossing
oceans than the galley, which ferried the empire's officers, administration
and military might, and other business which could not wait -- for if sails
propelled Rome's commerce, it was oars which moved her ships of state.
Military requirements could not be subject to the caprice of nature. When
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the army had to move, it couldn't wait for the wind to change. With a
galley, navigation was straightforward; one could steer a direct course to
the destination, and arrival could be predicted with some certainty. That
meant a naval action could be planned out beforehand, and the mission
planner had the freedom to set course and schedule according to the
timetable of the mission. These capabilities suited the methodical
romans well. Like no other society before them they took full advantage of
the organizational and schedular opportunities: in their galleys, roman
legions traversed the Mediteranean with impunity, extending their line of
march out into the Mediterranean in any direction as if it were a parade
ground.
But the reliablility of straining backs comes at a price: the men who pull
the oars must be fed and watered. This places a severe operational
limitation on the amount of time the galley can stay at sea. For short
voyages that is not a problem. A warship can sustain high performance for
the entire length of its mission; because it is out for less than a day, and
its crew does their eating and drinking ashore. For longer voyages however
food and water must be carried on board. Space is limited on any ship; but
a galley is more severely restricted because such a large fraction of the
available space is taken up by its crew. The amount of supplies that can
be fitted into the remaining space, together with the rate at which the
supplies are consumed, determines how how many days at sea the ship can
operate.
Compared with the distances commonly traveled by military vessels
across the empire, Varsovian's requirement was unprecedented. A trireme,
with its slender hull crammed with rowers for high performance, could
achieve perhaps three days traveling at 11 knots. The quinquireme, a much
larger warship, could last about a week, but it could sustain only about 7
knots. That was enough to cross the Mediterranean nonstop from Italy to
North Africa, but not enough for a voyage beyond the Pillars of Hercules. A
sailing vessel could last much longer between provisionings, of course, but
that was because they require fewer crew to operate; sometimes that
capability is needed to wait out periods of calm, or bad weather on some
lonely beach.
To row across the ocean, Varsovian would need a ship that compromised
crew size and speed for carrying capacity. His ship had to
maximize the range he could travel before his onboard supplies were
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exhausted. There were many choices to make and they all conflicted --
a.) You can carry plenty of rowers or plenty of supplies, but not both.
b.) Large ships carry more supplies than small ones but a larger crew is
needed.
c.) Large crews row faster; but that reduces the amount of food and water
you can carry and consumes it at a faster rate.
d.) Faster speed reduces the number of days in transit, but greatly
increases the rate at which supplies are consumed. The harder they
row, the faster they go. But the consumption rate goes up even faster.
e.) On the other hand, reducing crew effort does not necessarily reduce
consumption -- even if they don't row at all, they still eat.
The solution was to find a galley with moderate crew size and extra cargo
capacity, and a cruising speed that took minimum rowing effort to sustain.
Fortunately his experience suggested a compromise solution -- the
common troop galley ( fig. 5 ) which had served him so well in the
Mauretanian campaign. A medium size vessel of about 40 tons
displacement, there were hundreds of them in use throughout the empire;
used to ferry the army to wherever there was trouble. Designed to carry a
cohort of 100 fully armed troops and their officers, it was rowed by
another 100 men pulling on the oars and it also carried a lugsail rig for
periods of favorable wind. The troop galley was something of a
compromise -- For economy, sails could be used when the wind was
favorable; for reliability and for periods of unfavorable wind, there were
the oars. With moderate effort a galley of this design could be rowed
continuously at four or five knots, enough to cover thirty to forty leagues
per day. These galleys were not as fast as a warship, but they could stay
at sea for a much longer period. With its wider hull and smaller crew, it
normally carried enough food and fresh water for voyages of about ten
days. Varsovian would modify this vessel by removing the troop
accomodations and putting in more supplies, essentially replacing the 100
fully armed troops with provisions for his rowers. Based on the weight
and available volume alowed by this modification, he could lay in enough
extra provisions for an estimated 54 days of travel; a little less than two
months at sea.
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Varsovian calculated that if the ship could average thirty seven leagues
per day ( assuming assistance from favorable winds no more than half the
time ), 54 days of continuous travel could cover 2160 leagues. Which
would be enough to cross the Great Western Ocean if Ptolomy was right.
However, crossing the Great Western Ocean nonstop would still not be
enough range to accomplish the mission. His mission was not a one way
voyage. If he got there -- if he really found the coast -- he wouldn't be
able to count on a friendly port or fresh provisions. In fact, he might just
have to turn around in empty ocean and head home.
He would have to plan for a two way voyage. Westward across that
distance to China, or at least as far as China should be; then eastward
across that distance back to Gades. 1500-2000 leagues westward, then
1500-2000 leagues back. Twice the distance across the Great Western
Ocean from Spain to China. This created a thorny problem of course. The
2000 plus leagues of range he had managed to squeeze out of his troop
galleys was a one-way range. But the 2000 leagues of range he actually
needed was the round trip range, more commonly known as "distance to
point of no return" to where half the supplies are exhausted. Rowing
westwards from Gades, they would reach the point of no return ( fig. 6 )
only twenty-seven days into the voyage, a little over 1000 leagues. If he
was willing to gamble with his expedition and keep going -- a one way
voyage might possibly land them on the Chinese coast and, with a little bit
of luck, they might find a secluded harbor where they could foray ashore
for food and water. The risks, however, jeapordized the sucess of the
mission. What if they never sighted land? If a direct sea route to China
was truly out of reach, that would be dissappointing but nonetheless
valuable information. But it would be worse to make a successful
landfall, only to be butchered on shore by the local cavalry while trying to
hustle a few supplies ....
The only way his reconaissance mission could be a success was to ensure
that they could return home with the information. Besides, knowing you
can return generally enhances crew moralet He would have to find a way
to stretch his range to twice the 2000 or so leagues he had so far obtained,
with ships that were already at the limits of their range. It was a problem
which would have caused a lesser man to give up.
But the consumate planner Varsovian managed to solve this problem as
well. He determined a way to accomplish this by organizing the mission in
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a way which nearly doubled the range of his ships. He did it by augmenting
the expedition with additional vessels, and using them to replenish the
other ships at carefully timed intervals.
A fleet of thirty two galleys would be required. They would all leave the
port of Gades together on the Ides of June, rowing westward ( fig. 7 ).
Eighteen days later however, after one third of the food and water had been
exhausted, the fleet would split into two groups. His ships would pair off
with one another in mid-ocean and, within each pair, supplies would be
transferred from one ship to the other. The ship receiving the supplies
would be fully reloaded and would continue the voyage westward as
illustrated in fig. 8. The donor vessel, with just enough inventory left to
make a return trip, would turn east and head for home. As a result, the
expedition would gain an additional 54 days of operating time beyond the
18 that had already been used, and stretch their round trip range an extra
360 leagues beyond the original point of no return.
Twelve days later, or thirty days into the voyage, this maneuver would
take place again. Of the sixteen ships that had continued to row westward,
eight of them would relenquish a fraction of their supplies to their sister
ships and then turn home, leaving eight ships to continue the voyage
( fig. 9 ). Again, the westbound ships would be fully replenished; the
eastbound ships would head back with exactly enough food and water for
the return trip, since it was in fact the same amount that they had
consumed on the outbound leg. 240 more leagues of range would be gained.
Six days later, 1440 leagues west of Gades, the fleet would divide itself
once more ( fig. 10 ). Four galleys rowing westward, four galleys rowing
back. And, if land were not sighted within another six days, or forty-two
days from home port, the remaining ships could pair off once again, leaving
two galleys to venture onwards ( fig. 11 ). The expedition would have
covered 1680 leagues of open ocean at this point; a round trip distance
much further than any individual galley could have gone, and close to the
estimated distance from Spain to China. They would have another four
days to push further before the remaining galleys would have to reduce
their numbers again.
Forty six days from home port, eighteen hundred and forty leagues beyond
the Pillars of Hercules; if land had still not been sighted yet, there was
still margin for an additional four days of exploration. The expedition
could split itself up one last time ( fig. 12 ), sending the last galley west
for another 160 leagues. The final round trip range that resulted would be
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two thousand leages. Figure 13 summarizes the mission stages, their
separation points, the fractional gain in operating time and range obtained
with each stage.
Varsovian's plan was the first known use of staging to boost the range.
This approach had major strengths. He could obtain the endurance he
needed from ships whose capabilities were limited. It allowed him to
navigate a round trip distance which would have been otherwise
impossible. His plan not only extended the range of the expedition to
almost double that of any individual ship, but at the same time guaranteed
that every ship in the expedition could return. And it guaranteed that, with
portions of his fleet dropping out and returning home as the various
mission stages were exhausted, news of the expedition's progress could be
reported home at regular intervals. At each staging point he could choose
which ships should continue and which should return; ensuring himself only
the soundest ships and strongest crews to continue the voyage. Failed or
weakened elements could be removed to the rear; these would not have to
make the return voyage alone.
Best of all, the plan allowed for contingencies--there was plenty of
margin for error. If his range estimate was wrong; if he was unable to
make landfall for any reason, or if the China coastline proved to be
inhospitable he could still complete the mission with reasonabe confidence
that all his galleys could return safely. His plan not only extended the
range, it did so in a way which maximized his chances for success while
minimizing the risk to his ships and crew.
According to this plan, time at sea could be stretched to one hundred days,
almost double the range of any individual galley. The expedition could
travel westward for a full fifty days before it would have to turn around
and go home. Fifty days gave two thousand leagues -- and if Ptolomy's
estimate for distance were correct, landfall should be made sometime
within that period.
Unfortunately, Varsovian's plan could not anticipate the most difficult
phase of the mission where risks are usually the greatest: presentation of
his proposal to the Emporer and assembled senate ( fig. 14 ). The review
began encouragingly enough; everyone agreed that the conquest of China
would be a giant step forward. The Emperor had listened to his plan
carefully, had liked it, had endorsed it. Some of the senators had supported
it, for it appeared to be a reasonable plan. Before the army could invade, a
reconaissance mission was needed. It was logical, it minimized the risk,
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and the technology develolpments required to enable the mission were modest.
But the plan was very expensive. In fact, the costs were enormous;
instead of a simple scouting foray this expedition ( summarized by stages
in Table II ) had the dimensions of a full scale campaign -- thirty-two
troopships and four thousand men, just to carry out a scouting mission to
see if China was really on the other side of the ocean!
The cost alone of modifying thirty-two troop galleys was no small amount
of money. Of course, shipyards from Venicia to Tarantum would be busy
for months -- for the amount of business it represented Varsovian had
obtained some political support from families of the shipbuilders who had
furnished the fleet that carried Julius Caesar to his conquest of Britain.
They festooned the outer halls with banners that proclaimed:
"Rome needs the Expedition"
"It's time we raised our oars again"
But when the total costs of the mission were presented ( Table III ), the
opposition gave way to a c_amor -- most people could not understand going
to the expense of outfitting thirty-two ships for a voyage that would
actually be completed by one, two, or at the most four ships.
"Isn't your proposal just a little bit gold-plated?" asked Caius Flattus
Flavius, the ranking senator on the floor.
"Yes it is gold-plated." replied Lucius Marcellus, "gold-plating is the only
way we can do this mission when it really needs to be gold, but we can't
afford it .... "
With thirty-two galleys under stroke, the operating costs were outrageous.
Consider the anticipated charges for provisioning the ships, food, wine,
fresh water and casking; not to mention wages for the crew-- they would
all have to be volunteers.
The opposition was vocal, and the criticisms were hard to answer. How
could these enormous expenditures be justified? Varsovian's proposal
violated the limits which govern every enterprise involving public monies:
Where expenditure is great, great risk is not tolerated. Where risk is
great, great expenditure is not tolerated.
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"A publicity stunt" some said. "Lucius Marcellus wants to take the army
on a boat ride to China?" With riots at home and rebellions abroad, there's
no way to justify committing all those troops to some wild expedition.
Besides, Varsovian could not guarantee that the expedition would succeed.
He couldn't prove that the results of the expedition would pay back its
cost. Could he show any tangible benefit? Certainly not within the next
fiscal year...
"What are they gonna do when that last galley finally gets there; conquer
all of China with only one cohort?" -- snorted Caius Crassus.
"If you're gonna go that way with all those ships, why don't you just keep
going and invade the place while you're at it -- it wouldn't be that much
more expensive than the fiasco you have proposed!"
For several hours of testimony the debate raged on. No decision was
reached, but they agreed to appoint a committee to study Varsovian's
proposed plan further; subject it to a cost/benefit tradeoff analysis to
see if it could be re-optimized within a reduced range of performance
parameters and budget constraints. It was at that point that Varsovian
had turned on his heel and marched out of the senate chamber in disgust. In
the end, they had voted to table the issue until a more decisive mandate
could be established.
So why didn't they do it? Why didn't they go, when they were so strong
and capable -- why didn't they seize the opportunity, to resume their
unbroken string of conquests, conquests that had expanded their empire and
made them great? Setting out to finally conquer all of the known world
and, in doing so, encounter the unknown civilizations of the Maya, the
Toltec, the Incas instead? What juxtaposition of history might have
resulted, how would it have changed? What riches might have been
preserved had those ancient cultures of the New World been consolidated
under the bond of a greater Roman Empire, instead of being burned in the
fires of the Inquisition?
Why didn't they? The answer is a little too simple and a little too close
because, to know the answer to that question we do not have to look back
any further than the present time, and we don't have to look at anyone
further back than ourselves.
Sometimes having the enabling technology is not enough. It is because an
enabling technology must be enabling in more than just the physical sense;
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physically capable of rendering the mission. It must also be enabling in
the economic sense, rendering the costs and risks of the mission
reasonable. Reasonable cost means that the cost can be justified on the
basis of benefits that are immediately anticipated. The previous voyages
and discovery and exploration were more than bold ventures into the
unknown. They were ventures with an economic purpose. To find a cheaper
route to the Indies in order to facilitate a trade that was already thriving;
to claim and survey new lands that had been discovered, to go search for
easy riches. The king would not dip into his treasury and finance an
expedition unless he could anticipate a cut of the profits. And reasonable
risk means the immediate benefit anticipated by that risk taker must be
high enough to make the payoff outweigh the risk. No pioneer would take
chances to benefit only his unborn grandchildren -- a new world belonging
to future generations is not enough motivation to risk losing your scalp in
the present one!
Yes, we have the technology that makes it physically possible to venture
out beyond our known world to new worlds. Our combustion driven rockets
could take us wherever we want to go in the solar system. It would not be
impossible to make them large enough to carry men and their life support.
But while the chemical rocket propulsion technology developed to date has
undeniably made interplanetary travel possible, it has certainly not
enabled the mission yet. The combustion driven Mars spaceship must be
the size of an aircraft carrier and it carries the price tag of a major
military campaign -- hard to sell when the known benefits of this mission
are so intangible.
However we are developing more energetic means of power and propulsion
for our spaceships. Some of them, such as electric propulsion and nuclear
rockets, are driven by the atom. The electric propulsion technology, and
the nuclear power sources being developed in our laboratory could reduce
the size of our Mars spaceship by orders of magnitude. That might make
the price of our expedition more reasonable.
Lowering the price of the mission, making it more reasonable is where we
play our part. We space power technologists may get frusturated
sometimes because the benefits of our work are not immediately obvious
to everyone, and nobody ever wants to pay for it. How often the mission
planner reminds us that "better is the enemy of good". But we can take
comfort in the fact that the advanced technology we are working on now
will someday become the economically enabling technology for those
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future missions. Every advancement we make towards smaller, lighter,
more powerful and energetic spacecraft serves to reduce the cost and risk
of these adventures we are dreaming about. As progress continues, the
dream will come ever closer to reality.
Let's look back one more time at Lucius Marcellus Varsovian standing on
the pier. Bitter, disillusioned, cynical, he stares out to the sea dancing
on the horizon past the breakwall. His eyes pierce the afternoon sunlight
but they are blinded by bitterness and dissappointment. How will the
Empire survive if it cannot be bold enough to mount even this modest
expedition? When men and nations no longer dare to dream, what can the
future hold?
But as he stands there staring out to sea, he fails to see a most marvelous
thing taking place right in front of him. A graceful arab dhow, ( fig. 15 )
with its lateen rig and deep keel; her sharp prow and delicate forefoot
biting cleanly into the water, is threading its way out of the harbor
close-hauled, beating upwind towards the breakwall opening and the open
water beyond.
There is much more work to do before we venture out as explorers and colonists!
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